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In:: tfe of 
Devei .
The analysis o f  the privatisation o f state-owned enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
been based on very incomplete and out o f date data. This paper presents and discusses the 
preliminary results o f  a comprehensive survey o f privatisation transactions in SSA up until 
the end o f  1995. W hile previous research has concluded that the privatisation process has 
made only very limited process since the early-mid 1980s, the survey reveals (i) a generally 
much higher level o f  privatisation activity than that indicated by existing data sources; (ii) a 
very considerable range o f  country experiences with privatisation; and (iii) a marked increase 
in the number and overall value o f privatisation transactions since the early 1990s. While 
serious economic and political constraints continue to hamper the im plementation o f 
privatisation programmes in SSA, there is a strong likelihood that the intensity o f  the 
privatisation effort will continue to accelerate during the next five-ten years.
1 Fellow, IDS. David O'Brien provided excellent research assistance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privatisation o f  both the ownership and control o f state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is an 
increasingly central feature o f  all national economic reform programmes in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). In those countries where SOEs have dominated all or m ost sectors o f  the 
formal economy, comprehensive privatisation programmes are regarded (particularly by the 
World Bank and the IMF) as being o f  crucial importance for the future development o f  a 
strong private sector which, in many respects, has become the superordinate medium-long 
term objective o f adjustment programmes everywhere in Africa. Privatisation is also justified 
on the grounds that SOEs are invariably inefficient and, without decisive interventions, will 
continue to be a massive drain on extremely limited public resources (see W orld Bank, 1995).
Despite the centrality o f privatisation in the process o f economic reform in SSA, no detailed 
empirical research has ever been undertaken o f either the scope or the impacts o f  privatisation 
in the continent as a whole. In a recent article, Elliot Berg, probably the m ost well known 
com mentator on privatisation in SSA, remarks that "even the most casual effort to determine 
the number, nature, and impact o f privatisation transactions in sub-Saharan A frica reveals an 
extremely unsatisfactory state o f  knowledge. The best sources are World Bank documents, 
though these tend to be heavily preoccupied with numbers o f transactions...The result is a 
body o f knowledge that is not only thin, and heavily concentrated on numbers o f  transactions, 
but also full o f  inconsistencies and ambiguities" (Berg, 1996:6). In presenting the available 
estimates on divestitures, he cautions that "it is an open question whether they mislead more 
than they illuminate" (ibid: 10). Similar warnings have made in other recent publications on 
this subject (see, for example, Adam, 1994, Adam, Cavendish and M istry, 1992; African 
Development Bank, 1995; Fontaine and Geronimi, 1995; UNCTAD, 1995: UNIDO, 1994; 
World Bank, 1994).
Two W orld Bank data sets have been relied upon very heavily in assessing the overall 
progress o f  privatisation programmes in SSA. The first is the survey o f  all privatisation 
world-wide for the period 1980-1987 compiled by Candoy-Sekse. With regard to SSA, she 
enumerated a total o f  only 227 transactions that either had been completed or were underway 
in 1987, three-quarters o f  which were concentrated in six countries, namely Cote d'Ivoire, 
Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Togo and Uganda1 (see Candoy-Sekse, 1988). The second data base 
was assembled by Sader for the period 1988-1992. This survey reveals a similar story o f 
slow, often faltering progress o f privatisation programmes in SSA during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s with only 172 sales transactions recorded, again heavily concentrated in a handful
o f countries (in particular Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria).2
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This reliance on the Candoy-Sekse and Sader data sets gives a very incomplete picture o f  the 
extent o f  privatisation in SSA for three main reasons. First, country coverage is far from 
complete. In particular, countries, such as Mali and Madagascar, which have had reasonably 
sizeable privatisation programmes, at least by SSA standards, are not included in either data 
base. Secondly, there is widespread under-reporting o f  sales transactions among countries 
that are included in these data bases. In Benin, for example, only eight sales transactions are 
reported when, in fact, over 90 SOEs were sold or liquidated by 1992. And thirdly, there has 
been a marked increase in privatisation activity in SSA since 1992.
Given these shortcomings o f the available data, a lot more empirical research is needed in 
order to provide a more robust and up to date assessment o f the progress and likely prospects 
o f  privatisation in SSA. The purpose o f this article is to present and discuss the preliminary 
findings o f a comprehensive survey o f SOE privatisation transactions in SSA from the early 
1980s when the first privatisation programmes were begun up to the end o f 1995. While the 
survey is on-going and there are still some minor gaps in country coverage, the data that have 
been collected provide a reasonably detailed and accurate picture o f the number, type, and 
size o f privatisation transactions in SSA. This is particularly the case for those countries that 
only seriously embarked on privatisation from the early 1990s onwards.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the sources and types o f  data 
that were included in the survey. Section 3 presents an overview o f the number, value, type, 
and ownership characteristics o f  privatisations between 1980 and 1995 disaggregated by 
country and main economic sector. Sections 4 and 5 then discusses how the design and 
implementation o f privatisation programmes in SSA have been affected by a number o f key 
political and economic factors. Section 6 reviews the limited evidence that is available on the 
performance o f  privatised SOEs. Finally, section 7 considers the prospects for privatisation in 
SSA during the next five years.
Privatisation, in the broadest sense, entails the full or partial transfer o f  either ownership 
rights or management control o f SOEs to the private sector. Divestiture, on the other hand, is 
more narrowly concerned with the sale o f equity or assets o f SOEs as well as the outright 
liquidation o f enterprises as legal entities. Sales transaction can be either private or public. 
There are three basic types o f  private sales, namely competitive bidding using an open- 
tendering process, pre-emptive sales, and the sale/auction o f assets.3 Well established 
procedures have been developed for open-tender sales which, in the absence o f well 
developed capital markets (which is the normally the case in low income developing 
countries), is generally regarded as the most effective and transparent form o f divestiture. Pre­
emptive sales arise when existing shareholders have a legal right to exercise first option on 
the purchase o f  any government shares should they become available.
Public flotation o f SOE shares is possible when a country has a properly functioning stock 
exchange. This mode o f  privatisation is usually necessary for sale o f the largest SOEs 
(especially in the utilities and transport sectors) and, if  properly organised, has the added 
political and economic advantages o f enabling relatively large numbers o f  citizens to acquire 
shares. W here a government does not consider an SOE to be ready for full public flotation, 
this can be deferred in various ways. In particular, deferred public offerings are where private 
investors acquire full ownership on the condition that a certain percentages o f  shares will be 
sold over time to smaller shareholders. In countries that do not yet have stock exchanges, 
privatisation trust funds (PTFs) can also be established that allow governments to keep SOE 
shares in trust until such time that they can be sold to the public.
Non-divestiture (or non-asset) privatisations occur when governments either do not want or 
are unable to sell an SOE to the private sector, but the government still wants to transfer 
overall responsibility for the control o f  the enterprise to the private sector. Three main options 
are usually available namely leases and franchises, and management and performance 
contracts.
2. DATA SOURCES
Data from five main sources were utilised for the survey, (i) The Candoy-Sekse and Sader 
data bases for the periods 1980-1987 and 1988-1992 respectively, (ii) Unpublished data from 
the World Bank that partially updates the Sader data base up to and including 1995. (iii) 
Reports and other documentation produced by government commissions, committees and 
units that have been specially established, often with technical assistance from the World 
Bank and other donors, to design and implement privatisation programmes in SSA. Basic 
information on all transactions was obtained from almost all countries that have had active 
privatisation programmes during the 1990s, including Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.4 (iv) Information provided by 
country desk officers for SSA, and staff o f the Private Sector Department at the World Bank; 
and (v) A variety o f other publications including the local and international business m edia.5 
Grey cover World Bank reports on private sector development were particularly useful for a 
number o f  countries.
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Data on all key aspects o f  privatisation were collected wherever possible. This included both 
details o f each enterprise (name, sector, employment) and the privatisation transaction itself 
(date, type, reference and agreed prices, percentage o f  equity or assets divested, ownership 
characteristics). W hile it was not always possible to collect all these data for every country, 
basic information on the type o f privatisation transaction was obtained for 1165 enterprises in 
32 countries.
3. OVERVIEW
The following overview summarises the most salient characteristics o f  privatisation 
transactions in SSA. W hile this covers the years 1980 to 1995, the focus o f  attention is on the 
most recent period, 1988-1995.
(a) Number o f privatisations
Table 1 presents information on the overall number o f divestitures (wherever possible 
disaggregated into sales and liquidations) and other non-asset privatisations for each SSA 
country between 1980-1995. These data have been collated from a wide variety o f  sources. 
Wherever possible, country estimates are derived from information on individual enterprises 
that have been privatised but, for a minority o f countries, only total figures are available 
concerning sales, liquidations and other privatisations. Countries for which there are no data 
whatsoever are unlikely to have had major privatisation programmes. For a few countries 
(including Guinea Bissau and Togo) the data are not up to date. Finally, data on liquidations 
and other non-asset privatisations are generally less comprehensive and up to date than for 
actual sales.6 For all these reasons, the total numbers o f divestitures and privatisation 
presented in Table 1 for the continent as a whole should still be regarded as under-estimates.
The main conclusion o f  nearly all research that has been undertaken to date on privatisation
in SSA is that progress has been very limited. The information presented in Table 1 suggests
however that, even discounting for the large number o f very small privatisations in
Mozambique (most o f  which are retail outlets), there were at least three times as many sales
transactions during the period 1980-1995 than the total recorded in the combined Candoy-
Sekse and Sader data bases for 1980-1992 and that, furthermore, there has been a very
considerable range o f  country outcomes. In broad geographical terms, in West Africa and
East and Central Africa, it can be observed that approximately one-quarter o f SOEs had been
privatised in one form or another by the end o f 1995. In Southern Africa, with the exception
o f Mozambique and Zambia, there has been relatively little privatisation activity. And, even
in these two countries, a significant proportion o f privatised SOEs have been sold by
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fragmenting them into separate operating units so that the number o f  reported sales 
transactions alone is a poor indicator o f the relative size o f their respective privatisation 
programmes,7
Three groups o f  countries in SSA can be delineated, (i) M ajor privatisers (most notably 
Benin, Guinea, and Mali) where the majority o f SOEs have been divested; (ii) Modest 
privatisers where typically less than 10 percent o f the total value o f public assets has been 
divested (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo in 
West Africa, and Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zam bia in East 
and Central Africa); and (iii) Minimal and non-privatisers, totalling some 25 countries.
SSA countries can also be categorised according to when their privatisation programmes 
effectively began. Five francophone West African countries-Benin, Guinea, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo were the first group to start such programmes from the late 1970s up to the mid- 
1980s. In the case, however, o f  the pathbreaker, Senegal, this early start did not result in any 
significant progress being made. In fact, there were more SOEs in Senegal in the late 1980s 
than there were ten years earlier. A second, larger group o f  countries did not formally 
embark on privatisation programmes until the late 1980s (Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Mali, Kenya, Malawi, M ozambique, Madagascar, Uganda). Most o f these programm es were 
largely the outcome o f pressure from the World Bank and IMF. However, w ith the exception 
o f N igeria and possibly M ali (for which data are not available), Table 2 shows that no 
substantial progress was made in any o f these countries until at least the early 1990s when, 
for the first time, some governments began to take public sector reform more seriously. 
Another group o f 'la te  starters' did not formally start privatisation programmes until well into 
the 1990s. Three o f these countries, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and Zambia, have shown fairly 
strong political commitment to privatisation whereas in the other three, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Sierra Leone, only minimal progress had been made by late 1995.
Nearly three times as many SOEs were partially or completely sold during 1988-95 than in 
the preceding eight year period (see Table 2). Furthermore, the annual num ber o f sales 
transactions increased markedly during this latter period - from just four in 1988 to 161 in 
1995. So too has the total annual value o f sales. Excluding the three relatively large 
divestitures in South Africa and the two exceptional privatisations in Ghana (Ashanti 
Goldmines in 1984) and in Nigeria (an oil field o f the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation in 1993), it can be observed in Table 3 that the total US dollar value o f 
divestitures in 1994-95 was double the level in 1989-90.
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Despite, the quite impressive increase in the number o f privatisation in recent years, progress 
as measured against privatisation programme country targets has been poor in most countries. 
In part this is because o f the typically three-four year delay before privatisation programmes 
have begun to be seriously implemented. And in other countries, political commitment 
remained consistently weak throughout this period. In Cameroon, for example, only five o f 
the 30 SOEs scheduled for privatisation were sold by the end o f 1995. Even in a country such 
as Tanzania where government support for privatisation has been relatively strong, less than 
one-quarter o f  the SOEs scheduled for divestiture in 1995 were successfully sold in that year.
In other countries, the privatisation programme started reasonably well, but then stalled 
completely. Nigeria's programme, which in many ways had been one o f the most successful 
in SSA, was suspended in early 1995 in favour o f a mass programme o f 'commercialisation' 
that, by mid 1996, had still not got o ff the ground. Also in 1995, the leaders o f the newly 
installed military regime in Gambia not only suspended the privatisation programme but also 
tried to reverse some privatisations. Pressure from the World Bank eventually stopped them 
from doing this. Elsewhere, Madagascar's privatisation programme was also suspended (in 
mid 1993) due mainly to serious mismanagement and its unpopularity among the mass o f  the 
population. The small privatisation programme in Malawi mainly involved just one public 
corporation (ADMARC) but, given an acute shortage o f private sector investors, most o f  the 
targeted enterprises were eventually sold to the government, leading politicians, and a few 
large foreign investors8 and, after a flurry o f  activity in 1988, the programme quickly fizzled 
out.
(b) Sector
By mid 1996, basic information on individual transactions had been collected for 1165 SOE 
privatisations (895 sales, 168 liquidations, and 102 other) in SSA between 1980 and 1995. 
Over half (52.1 percent) o f  all SOEs partially or completely sold have been in the 
manufacturing sector (see Table 4). Four other sectors-agriculture, finance, hotels and 
tourism, and trade accounted for another 27.7 percent o f all sales transactions. The largest 
SOEs and hence the bulk o f public assets are utilities, mining, and transport enterprises, but 
there have been very few divestitures in these sectors. As noted earlier, information on 
liquidations and other non-asset privatisations are incomplete in many countries. It can be 
observed however, that leases, and management and performance contracts appear to have 
been concentrated in five sectors namely agriculture, manufacturing, utilities, hotels and 
tourism, and transport and storage.
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Smaller SOEs have generally been targeted during the initial stages o f  privatisation 
programmes in SSA mainly because they are easier to sell. Within the manufacturing sector, 
five industries have been particularly prominent in most national privatisation programmes 
namely, food processing, alcoholic beverages, textiles, cement and other non-metallic 
products, and metal products. Excluding the exceptionally large sale o f ISCOR in South 
Africa, these four industries accounted for 60.0 percent o f  the total proceeds from the sale o f 
manufacturing SOEs between 1988 and 1995. Other industries have attracted little interest 
form either local or foreign investors. The bulk o f  larger manufacturing SOEs that have been 
sold in most countries (and generally to foreign investors) have again been in the food 
processing (including sugar), alcoholic beverages, cement, and textiles industries.
(c) Size o f sales transactions
Unfortunately, no data are available on the value o f divestitures in SSA between 1980 and 
1987. For the period 1998-1995, the survey indicates that the total value o f  transactions was 
US$2.73 billion.9 which is approximately one percent o f the value o f all divestitures w orld­
wide. Table 5 shows that three countries- Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana accounted for 
nearly three-quarters o f all transactions. Tanzania and Kenya had the next largest shares o f  
4.4 percent and 4.3 percent respectively. With respect to sectoral distribution, it can be 
observed in Table 6 that the mining and manufacturing sectors comprised over 80 percent o f  
total privatisation proceeds in SSA. The only other sizeable sectors were hotels and tourism 
(6.0 percent), financial (4.7 percent), and agriculture (3.9 percent).
The overall median value o f  the privatisation sales for the SOEs for which data was available 
was only US$ 370,000 between 1988 and 1995. There are, however, quite considerable inter­
country variations in median sales values. In Mozambique and Zambia, these were as low as 
US$200,000 and US$250,000 respectively which in part is because both countries have 
'bidder-driven' privatisation programmes coupled with the widespread fragmentation o f  SOEs 
into separate units (see below). Where foreign investors have tended to predominate (as in 
Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo), median sales values have been much higher. The sectoral 
breakdowns presented in Table 6 show that agriculture, construction and trade have had the 
lowest median sales values o f  US$180,000, US$200,00, and US$140,000 respectively. As 
expected, the highest values are for the mining, financial and utility sectors.10
The five largest divestitures during this period were ISCOR (iron and steel, US$500 million) 
and ALUSAF (aluminium smelting, US$100 million) in South Africa, Ashanti Goldmines in 
Ghana (US$485 million), an oil field belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (US$500 million), and the Tanzania Cigarette Company (US$55 million).
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Between them, these five sales accounted for 60.1 percent o f total proceeds (see Table 7). The 
178 SOEs sold for US$1 million or more were only 30.6 percent o f  the total number o f 
divestitures for which sales data are available for this period but accounted for 96 percent o f 
the total value o f transactions." Slightly less than 56 percent o f SOEs were sold for under 
US$0.5 million but only 2.0 percent o f total proceeds was earned from this group o f 
enterprises. In the absence o f significant 'broadbasing' o f  SOE divestitures in SSA, it is clear 
therefore, that ownership o f state assets has been concentrated in the hands o f a relatively 
very small number o f companies and individuals.
In the absence o f  reliable country estimates o f  the total value o f SOEs, it is not possible to 
calculate precisely the proportions (in value terms) o f the total public assets that have been 
sold and liquidated. But even in a country like Nigeria which, by African standards, has had a 
large privatisation programme, this figure was still less than five percent by early 1995.
(d) Type o f  sale
Table 8 shows that over half o f  SOEs were reported as having been sold using private sale 
open tender procedures. Again, however, there are some interesting differences in the sales 
techniques that have been employed by SSA countries. Deferred sales have been particularly 
common in Ghana and Zambia mainly in order to encourage greater involvement in 
privatisation programmes by indigenous (i.e. African) entrepreneurs. In Kenya, pre-emptive 
sales have dominated a fairly limited privatisation process which, because o f their inherent 
lack o f  transparency, has resulted in widespread concerns about corruption and 
undervaluation o f enterprises (see below). In Uganda, over half o f all privatised SOEs have 
been repossessions by their mainly Asian owners (in particular the Mehta and M adhvani 
families)
The existence o f  stock exchanges in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, in Cote 
d'Ivoire has undoubtedly facilitated the sale o f larger SOEs. The median value o f  public 
flotation divestitures was US$2.14 million compared with only US$0.1 million for private 
sales (see Table 8). In Nigeria and Ghana, restrictions on the size o f individual shareholdings 
has also expanded considerably the number o f citizens with a direct stake in erstwhile SOEs 
which in turn has boosted political support for the privatisation process. In Nigeria, over 
850,000 individuals bought shares in 51 enterprises.
Despite mounting concerns from both politicians and the public at large about the limited 
involvement o f  African citizens in larger divestitures, relatively few privatisation 
programmes have had well designed and adequately resourced PTFs or similar instruments.
The PTF in Zambia has been held up as an example o f good practice (see Bell, 1995) but 
even here, only three SOEs had been sold using this method by the end o f 1995. The failure 
to develop viable PTFs from the start o f the privatisation process in countries such Ghana, 
Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda has been a major factor inhibiting the involvement 
o f  Africans. This failure can, in part, be attributed to the often undue haste with which some 
privatisation programmes have been started.
In Uganda, an interesting development has been the public auctioning o f SOE shares. This 
has been done albeit on a limited scale from 1995 onwards and has enabled much greater 
involvement o f  African citizens in the privatisation process thereby placating, at least to some 
extent, the critics o f  privatisation. Moreover, because o f the heavy demand for shares, the 
proceeds from these public share auctions have been considerably higher than from private 
sales where there have been usually only a very limited number o f  mainly foreign bidders 
(see M uganwa, 1996). Thus, it is clear that the mode o f divestiture is a critical determinant o f 
the overall success o f privatisation programmes.
(e) Purchaser characteristics
While privatisation units normally provide information on the names o f  companies and 
individuals who have purchased SOE equity and assets, without additional research, it is 
frequently not possible to ascertain whether the new owners are African and non-African 
nationals (in particular Asians in East and Central Africa and Lebanese entrepreneurs in W est 
Africa) and/or foreign investors. Out o f a total 895 recorded sales in the data base, only 377 
(42.1 percent) could be positively identified as being 'local investors' with another 174 
enterprises definitely having some foreign investment.12 However, most o f the remaining 344 
SOEs are small enterprises, and thus the large majority o f them are also likely to have been 
purchased by local investors.
In Nigeria, apart from the purchase o f an NNPC oil field by E lf Aquitaine, there has been no 
foreign participation whatsoever in the country's privatisation programme. In Mozambique 
and Zam bia upwards o f 80 percent o f the purchasers o f divested SOEs have been reported as 
being local investors. However, the proportion o f investors who are Africans has generally 
been small. In Tanzania, for example, only 15 out o f 90 SOEs that had been sold by the end 
o f  1995 had been bought by 'wazawa' (swahili for indigenous people) despite the fact that the 
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission had, wherever possible, given preferential treatment to 
this group. In Zambia, the number o f genuinely African owners is somewhat higher (probably 
around 40 percent). This is partly because o f  the larger number o f  employee and management
buy-outs (17 by December 1995), and the fragmentation o f many SOEs into smaller units (in
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particular in the agriculture and food processing sectors). Fragmentation of SOEs has also 
enabled greater involvement of nationals in M ozambique than would otherwise have been 
possible.
The proportion of the proceeds o f a divestiture paid in foreign exchange is a reasonably good 
indicator of the extent of foreign ownership. Table 6 shows that local investors accounted for 
slightly less than one half of all divestiture proceeds between 1988 and 1995.13 Among the 
most important sectors, the highest levels o f  local financial involvement were in 
manufacturing, finance and trade while the lowest were in agriculture, hotels and tourism, and 
mining. Interestingly, in most SSA countries, it is these latter sectors that are likely to have 
the highest growth potential in the context o f  widespread trade liberalisation. Not 
surprisingly, foreign investment has been concentrated among the larger SOEs that have been 
sold. Excluding Nigeria (where almost all SOEs were purchased by local investors), nearly 
two thirds of all sales transactions o f more than U S$1.0 million involved foreign investors.
In the large majority of countries, the state has divested its entire ownership stake in SOEs 
that have been sold. Only 123 SOEs out o f  a total o f  895 recorded in the data base continued 
to have some state involvement after privatisation. State involvement continues to be highest 
in countries that had previously had socialist development strategies (in particular Burkina 
Faso, Mozambique, and Tanzania) but for 85 percent o f  the 123 SOEs for which data are 
available, this was a minority shareholding.14
4. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
A variety of political and economic factors have affected the design, implementation and 
outcomes of privatisation programmes in SSA. During the 1980s, most governments openly 
opposed the sale or liquidation o f  SOEs which clearly prevented the widespread adoption of 
viable privatisation programmes. However, during the 1990s political constraints have 
become less critical in many countries (although, o f  course, privatisation remains an 
intensely political process), and instead the saleability o f SOEs and the mode of privatisation 
are increasingly the major concerns. Thus, whereas ten years ago the key question for most 
governments in SSA was why they should privatise, now they are primarily concerned with 
how privatisation programmes can be designed and implemented most effectively. The 
following discussion examines why this shift has occurred by looking at how the 
privatisation process in SSA has been influenced by key stakeholders, in particular politicians 
and bureaucrats, public sector workers, and local and foreign business interests since the mid 
1980s.
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(a) Politicians and bureaucrats
The main conclusion of virtually all research on privatisation in SSA is that the generally 
slow progress that has been made to date can be largely attributed to a pervasive and deep- 
seated lack of commitment at the highest political levels. In m any countries, this has been 
further compounded by the limited political feasibility o f  actually introducing major 
privatisation programmes due mainly to strong opposition from entrenched vested interests, 
most notably senior bureaucrats in ministries and SOEs themselves as well from public sector 
workers who have expressed understandable concern about the possibility of mass 
retrenchments. Furthermore, there have been less self-interested but nonetheless widespread, 
long-standing and usually quite intense nationalist/populist concerns about the possible 
adverse political and economic consequences of increased foreign investment that are likely 
to arise as a result of privatisation. The key political problem, it is argued, is that the costs of 
privatisation are borne fairly immediately by relatively small but powerful groups whereas 
the benefits are only likely to be spread more slowly among society as a whole. Thus, 
collective action is easier to organise against reform than for it (see van der Walle, 1989 and 
Galal and Shirley, 1994).
As note earlier, only a handful of governments in SSA were seriously committed to 
privatisation during the 1980s. The rest tended to play lip service to the W orld Bank and the 
IMF with respect to their demands for public sector reform. While these organisations 
generally managed to convince governments to adopt the privatisation o f  SOEs as a central 
objective of economic reform programmes, their own operational personnel were usually too 
preoccupied with the first crucial stage of the reform process, namely the implementation of 
basic macroeconomic reforms to pay much attention to public sector reform.
While this conclusion is broadly correct for the 1980s, im portant political and economic 
changes have occurred since then which have resulted in m ajor shifts in both privatisation 
policy and practice. Whereas most African governments resisted anything more than token 
privatisation during the 1980s, there are currently only a handful o f  countries where 
privatisation programmes have either seriously stalled or where there is little likelihood that 
major privatisation programmes will not be introduced in the near future.15 Why then have 
there been such major changes in both the political com mitment and political feasibility of 
privatisation in SSA countries during the last five years?
First, most governments in SSA have become progressively more convinced o f the need for
far reaching economic reform, including reform o f the parastatals sector. W hile the economic
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benefits o f  adjustment programmes are still not particularly visible for the bulk o f  the 
working population in most countries, m ost governments with the 'support' o f  the 
increasingly powerful international finance institutions and the main bilateral donor 
agencies16 are accelerating the pace o f economic reform. As an integral part o f  these 
programmes, privatisation is also being pursued more seriously. In the past, the strongest 
resistance to privatisation had come from countries where adjustment programmes had not 
been introduced at all or where they had seriously faltered. With governments in SSA 
becoming ever more dependent on donor funding, such recalcitrance is now uncommon. The 
fact also that these programmes have now been in place in most countries for at least ten 
years means that their populations have been 'softened up' with respect to the need for a 
strong private sector in a liberalised economy. More generally, as privatisation has proceeded 
apace throughout the developed and developing world, there is now much greater acceptance 
o f the need for effective privatisation as part and parcel o f economic reform, and the 
development o f an internationally competitive economy.
Second, significant political liberalisation has created additional political space (or 'room for 
manoeuvre') in order to inaugurate or revamp privatisation programmes. In particular, multi­
party elections in a number o f countries (e.g. Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia) have 
allowed newly installed governments to distance themselves from the statist policies o f  their 
predecessors who had a strong vested interest in protecting the public sector. Tight corporatist 
links with key stakeholders such as trade unions, one party bureaucracies, and state 
functionaries have been seriously weakened as governments have become more dependent on 
the electorate as a whole for their political survival.
Thirdly, the already dire financial state o f SOEs has continued to deteriorate at a time when 
the fiscal crisis o f  the state in almost all SSA countries is more acute than ever. In general, 
attempts to restructure SOEs using performance and management contracts with existing 
managements has not been successful. For both these reasons, therefore, the need to sell off, 
liquidate or fully privatise the management o f SOEs has become that much more urgent.
And finally, with the key macroeconomic reforms now implemented in most countries in 
SSA, private sector development is now at (or very near) the top o f the World Bank's 
economic and political reform agendas. Given the general failure o f these macroeconomic 
reforms to resolve the economic crisis in SSA, the Bank has become increasingly aware o f 
the critical need to develop the private sector in order to ensure high and sustainable 
economic growth in the future. Consequently, much greater pressure is now being applied on 
governments to privatise rapidly all types o f SOEs, both large and small, with the World
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Bank now actively encouraging governments to sell SOEs rather than opt for non-asset types 
o f  privatisation.
Despite the importance o f  these changes in the political and economic context in the large 
majority o f  SSA countries since the late 1980s, it would clearly be naive to think that there 
now exists total political commitment to privatisation or that serious opposition by various 
stakeholders will no longer arise. As will be discussed shortly, major political obstacles still 
have to surmounted in all countries. However, it seems increasingly unlikely that these 
obstacles will effectively undermine the privatisation process in the majority countries as was 
the case during the 1980s.
(b) Indigenous and foreign business interests
One o f  the key political concerns about privatisation in SSA has been that SOEs should be 
sold, wherever possible, to African citizens. This is particularly the case in anglophone East 
and W est Africa where Asian and Lebanese business communities have been in more 
advantageous positions to acquire larger SOEs. Resistance to 'foreign involvement' has been 
much less pronounced in francophone SSA mainly because o f the relatively undeveloped 
state o f  the indigenous business sector. For this reason, privatisation programmes in these 
countries have tended to be foreign dominated.
Concerns that 'wazawa' are not squeezed out by local Asian and foreign companies during 
privatisation have been repeatedly made by politicians in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and, 
to a lesser extent, Malawi and Zambia. However, where the private sector as a whole is still 
very small and fragile after years o f public sector domination in most economic sectors (as in 
Tanzania and Zambia, for example), actual resistance to non-African investors acquiring the 
lion's share o f  attractive SOEs on offer has been quite limited. In Tanzania, for example, well 
over half o f  divested enterprises have been sold to Asian companies and entrepreneurs. 
Generally speaking, there has been less political controversy surrounding the sales o f  the 
largest SOEs in these countries to well known transnational corporations as there has for 
much smaller enterprises to Asian businessmen most o f  whom are nationals. In Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, the prospect o f local white business communities being the principal 
beneficiaries o f privatisation has been one o f the main hurdles preventing these countries 
from embarking seriously on privatisation.
The limited capacity o f African entrepreneurs and other indigenous organisations to purchase
SOEs is reflected by the high incidence o f "uncommsumated transactions" in a number o f
countries, most notably Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Nigeria and, to a slightly lesser
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extent, in Burkina Faso and Uganda. In Guinea, already grossly undervalued SOEs were sold 
for Guinea Franc 21 billion (approximately $US 600 million at m id-1980 exchange rates) but 
only one tenth o f  this total was ever paid. In Ghana, 12 enterprises, collectively valued at over 
20 percent o f  the 1990-1994 tranche o f privatisations, had to be 'redivested' because o f  the 
non-payment o f  mainly deferred sales agreements. Between 1990 and 1994, gross sales o f 
SOE equity and assets amounted to C63.1 billion o f which only 34 percent had been paid by 
the end o f  May 1994. Similarly, in Nigeria, N2.3 billion out o f a total o f  N5.7 billion had still 
not been received by April 1993.
Ethnic rivalry has further adversely affected the ability o f indigenous entrepreneurs and other 
individuals to participate in privatisation programmes and has seriously discouraged some 
governments from taking privatisation more seriously. In Kenya and Cameroon, in particular, 
political elites who are drawn predominantly from particular ethic groups (Kalenjin and from 
the south respectively) have seen privatisation as a threat because o f  the superior economic 
position o f  ethnic rivals (mainly the Kikuyu in Kenya and from the north in Cameroon). 
Allowing these ethnic rivals to purchase the bulk o f SOEs would undermine their ability to 
control patrimonial state apparatuses. In Nigeria, traditional rivalry between north and south 
was also a major factor that shaped the allocation o f shares in SOEs sold after 1988.
While m ost governments would clearly like to maximise the participation o f Africans in 
privatisation programmes, most political leaderships now accept that these programmes are 
unlikely to succeed without significant foreign investment. As in the past, governments in 
some countries have tried to reduce the potentially conflicting objectives of, on the one hand, 
upholding national economic sovereignty while, on the other, attracting foreign capital and 
skills by continuing to maintain ownership stakes in key SOEs. Thus, particularly for larger 
SOEs, reputable international companies are often sought as 'strategic partners' with either 
government or local investors. But, unlike joint ventures in the past, the state is now almost 
always a minority shareholder.
(c) Labour
The threat posed to public sector employment is another commonly cited reason for the
resistance o f  SSA governments to widespread privatisation. SOE managers and workers
represent a very powerful political constituency in most SSA countries. But, despite the
importance o f  employment issues, virtually no relevant data are available. Perhaps not
surprisingly, privatisation units do not usually divulge very much information about the size
o f retrenchments among divested SOEs. It is usually claimed however that very few
redundancies have occurred. Zambia is one such country where this claim has been made. In
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Table 9 it can be observed that relatively very few redundancies were reported among those 
enterprises for which data are available. However, comparing the number o f workers 
employed in these enterprises immediately after privatisation in 1993, 1994 and 1995 with 
employment levels in 1992 (independently reported elsewhere) shows that a very sizeable 
proportion o f  the labour force was shed in the period leading up to privatisation.
Opposition to privatisation by workers o f  SOEs has been a major retarding factor in many 
SSA countries, but in particular in Ghana, Malawi, and Tanzania. During a public address in 
1996, the Executive Director o f  the Ghana Divestiture Committee noted that "some problems 
on the labour front still persist, resulting in a spate o f lawsuits, thus delaying the pace o f  the 
programme in certain respects" (Ghana Divestiture Committee, 1996:10). W orkers at four 
relatively large SOEs in Tanzania took legal action against the Parastatal Sector Reform 
Comm ission during 1994 and 1995 but, on each occasion, their attempts to prevent the sale o f  
their companies were given short shrift by the courts. Workers in countries such as 
M ozambique which adopted Marxist-Leninist/socialist development strategies after 
independence frequently have a strong sense o f ownership o f  their enterprises and have 
strenuously resisted privatisation.
The paym ent o f  terminal benefits to workers is another major issue. In Ghana, enterprises 
have been able to negotiate very high levels o f benefits which has seriously deterred potential 
investors. And where SOEs are technically bankrupt (as has been commonly the case in 
Tanzania), they cannot pay these benefits. Generally speaking, however, adjustment 
programm es have resulted in the creation o f more flexible labour markets which have 
seriously undermined the power o f organised labour to resist falls in real wages and 
retrenchments.
5. THE SALEABILITY OF SOEs
W hile the political environment has become more conducive for comprehensive privatisation
in SSA during the 1990s, the actual saleability o f SOEs, in particular the larger ones, has
remained a key constraint in most SSA countries. Potential purchasers o f SOEs have to weigh
up a num ber o f  economic and political factors when assessing the attractiveness o f acquiring
a particular enterprise and the price they are prepared to pay. The overall economic climate is
clearly o f  paramount concern and, as elsewhere, investors focus on the 'fundamentals' o f an
econom y as a whole as well as the specific product markets they are interested in. For most
sectors and economies, these fundamentals have not changed dramatically during the 1990s.
Foreign investors invariably take their lead from local investors, but private investment as a
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proportion o f  GDP has continued to fall in all but a handful o f  SSA economies (see IFC, 
1995). Markets in the traded goods sectors have become appreciably more competitive as a 
result o f  trade liberalisation, but real interest rates are at historically very high levels and 
underlying economic growth has remained weak. Only a few, usually quite profitable, 
manufacturing industries (food, beer and spirits, cement, cigarettes, sugar refining) as well as 
more recently mining and tourism have attracted any significant foreign investment. Most 
other manufacturing industries have been seriously affected by adjustment programmes and 
some, most notably textiles, iron and steel, other metal and electrical goods, and vehicle 
assembly are in a serious state o f decline in many countries. As a consequence, disinvestment 
by foreign companies engaged in manufacturing activities has been widespread (see Bennell,
1995).
(b) Government credibility
Investors' assessments o f the overall credibility o f government economic policies and the 
privatisation programme in particular is also o f critical importance in determining the general 
saleability o f SOEs. Given the much higher levels o f government commitment to establishing 
or further strengthening the 'market economy' coupled with the extreme unlikelihood o f  re­
nationalisation in the future, privatisation programmes enjoy much higher levels o f  credibility 
among investors than in the past. However, major doubts still persist especially where 
governments have shown little commitment to privatisation until very recently and 
widespread allegations have been made about the lack o f transparency and corruption in the 
management o f the privatisation process. These doubts only tend to be magnified when 
governments are seen to be offering too many 'sweeteners' to prospective investors. It is 
equally important that governments are able to show that 'bell-whether sales' o f SOEs made 
during the early stages o f privatisation programmes have indeed succeeded in turning them 
around but genuine 'success stories' o f good performance sustained over a relatively long 
period are still very difficult to find in most countries in SSA (see below). One reason for the 
slow progress o f privatisation programmes in some countries may simply be because such a 
large proportion o f attempted privatisation have not been successful.
(c) Transactions transparency
Lack o f  transparency in SOE sales transactions has been a major concern among prospective
investors in most SSA countries. In part, this can be attributed to weaknesses in the
management capabilities o f those who have been entrusted to implement privatisation
programmes. However, to a large extent, poor transparency has been the direct consequence
o f opportunistic behaviour by both politicians and bureaucrats eager to cream-off, perhaps for
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the last time, sizeable rents from their control o f SOEs. A guiding principle o f privatisation 
programmes is that there should be clear, unambiguous criteria laid down for the evaluation 
o f  bids by prospective purchasers, and that the tendering process itself should be competitive 
with full public disclosure o f all bids. As mentioned earlier, pre-emptive divestitures are 
particularly susceptible to the under-valuation o f  assets and preferential treatment o f  a 
particular bidder in return for kickbacks to key politicians and bureaucrats. Equally serious, in 
some countries, open tendering procedures have been flouted and direct approaches by 
particular companies have been allowed and even encouraged. Cote d'Ivoire during the last 
years o f  the Houphuet-Boigny regime was particularly notorious for this de facto privatisation 
o f  the privatisation process. Similarly, in Cameroon, in at least three o f  the five sales o f SOEs 
that had been completed by 1995, the government clearly favoured a particular investor 
coupled with serious embezzlement o f  the sales proceeds by bureaucrats responsible for the 
privatisation process (see Ejangue, 1996). In Madagascar, there has been "a generalised lack 
o f  transparency" (W orld Bank, 1995:52). Even in the relatively tightly managed privatisation 
programme in M ozambique, "investors report that they could influence the outcome o f  the 
bidding" (World Bank, 1995:74). Up to 80 percent o f the points awarded each to each bidder 
are awarded on the basis o f  non-price criteria which can seriously obscure the transparency o f 
the tendering process. In Uganda, creating an "atmosphere o f transparency has been difficult" 
(see Muganwa, 1996), especially given the widespread opposition that existed to the 
privatisation o f SOEs during the early years o f the programme.
Public flotation divestitures and the sales o f assets and shares at public auctions have been 
less susceptible to rent seeking behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats. Even in a country as 
notoriously corrupt as Nigeria, the main reliance on public flotations has meant that the 
opportunities for corruption have been considerably less than where all or most transactions 
have been by private sales.17
(d) Prospective investor and government valuations
The saleability o f  a particular SOE depends crucially on the price at which the government is
prepared to sell it. A major sticking point in the past has been that governments in SSA have
quite understandably wanted, for both financial and political reasons, to maximise the net
proceeds o f  divestitures, and have tended therefore to rely therefore on asset-based
valuations. Potential purchasers, on the other hand, have used mainly business-based
valuations that calculate the net worth o f an enterprise by estimating the likely net profit
streams and offsetting these against current liabilities. However, using this latter valuation
methodology, many SOEs in SSA have negative net worth and thus governments must be
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prepared to virtually give them away if  they are to be divested successfully. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, SOE sales have frequently become bogged by arguments about how assets should 
be valued. But, as long as governments stick to asset-based valuations, many SOEs will 
remain unsaleable.
The fact that so many SOEs have such enormous debts also seriously affects their saleability. 
Again, unless governments are prepared to take over these debts, there is little real prospect o f 
these SOEs being privatised. However, without major financial assistance, most governments 
in SSA are simply unable to do this. Similarly, in order to made saleable, many SOEs, in 
particular in the utility and transport sectors must first be comprehensively restructured and 
modernised which is invariably costly and time consuming and normally requires some form 
o f management or performance contract with private sector operators. Clearly, once the costs 
o f privatisation rise above a certain point, the overall net proceeds from sales transactions will 
become negative (as they did, for example, early in Uganda's privatisation programme).
The privatisation process can itself further undermine the saleability o f SOEs, especially 
where they are already in a parlous state. For example, in Mozambique, "in an effort to 
demonstrate commitment to the privatisation program, the government announces early on in 
the process which companies are to be privatised. Once the announcement is made it is 
difficult for the enterprises in question to do business. Credit dries up,...and foreign customers 
or reluctant to enter into contractual arrangements with such firms" (World Bank, 1995:69). 
As a result "operations are rendered virtually impossible" (ibid.).
Evidence on the saleability o f  SOEs is difficult to find and what does exist tends to be 
incomplete and fragmentary. However, what little is available does suggest that saleability 
has become the single most serious obstacle in most privatisation programmes. The high level 
o f re-divestitures in Ghana has already been mentioned. In Nigeria, 35 out o f the 95 SOEs 
that were eventually included in the privatisation programme had still not be sold by mid- 
1994. In Uganda, "offers for SOEs have only been between one-tenth and one-third o f  official 
valuations" (M uganwa,1996:7) and in Kenya, the privatisation programme continues to be 
seriously jeopardised because "too many companies on offer are unmarketable" 
(EIU,1995:13). Since the start o f the privatisation programme in Tanzania, "there have been 
many unsuccessful tenders" (PSRC, 1996:8). At the end o f 1995, 26 SOEs were reported as 
being 're-advertised'. The sale o f  most SOEs in Guinea was due mainly to the massive under­
valuation o f assets by government auditors.
For M ozambique, data are available on the government reference values (based on fixed
assets only) and agreed sales values for SOEs divested during 1994 and 1995. Total proceeds
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from the sale o f  49 enterprises actually exceeded their combined reference values. However, 
nearly 40 percent o f the enterprises were sold for less than 75 percent o f  their reference 
values, and these enterprises (which included two breweries and a cement factory) were also 
the most attractive investments on offer.
Finally, in Zambia, while progress during the first two years o f its privatisation programme in
1992 and 1993 was very slow, there has been a marked acceleration in the number o f  sales 
since then mainly because asset-based valuations have been largely dispensed with for most 
divestitures and the whole process has become increasingly 'bidder-driven'. It appears that 
this is also happening in Mozambique.
6. POST-PRIVATISATION PERFORMANCE
In view o f the rapidly growing importance o f privatisation in the overall process o f  economic 
reform in SSA, remarkably little information is available on the post-privatisation 
performance o f  erstwhile SOEs.18 It is clearly the case, however, that no SSA country can be 
singled out as a very successful privatiser in the same way as, for example, Chile has been in 
South America. Sporadic references can be found in the mainly grey literature on the success 
o f  individual divestitures but these amount to no more than 20 enterprises for the continent as 
a whole and are little more than casual observations rather than rigorous evaluations.19
Among the early group o f  privatisers in SSA (which therefore, have had the most opportunity 
to demonstrate the pay-offs from privatisation), Senegal is the only country where research 
has been undertaken on the post-privatisation performance o f  SOEs as a whole. Senegal was 
included as one o f  the nine case study countries in the World Bank's 1995 research study 
'Bureaucrats in Business'. With respect to all five o f the study's performance indicators (net 
operating surplus and profits before taxes as a percentage o f  sales revenue, real variable costs, 
total factor productivity and savings minus investment as a percentage o f  GDP), the collective 
performance o f  SOEs in Senegal deteriorated after privatisation. A recent W orld Bank report 
also concluded that, with the exception o f SONATEL, the national telecommunications 
company, "there seems to be no major improvement in the financial situation o f public 
enterprises under performance contract" (World Bank, 1996:11).
In Togo, the deep-seated political and related economic crisis o f the early 1990s effectively 
de-railed the country's privatisation programme. With real GDP falling by over one-third 
between 1991 and 1994, SOEs privatised during the 1980s were almost all badly affected. In
1993 alone, manufacturing output fell by 42 percent. Similarly in Niger, o f the 50 relatively
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large industrial enterprises that existed in 1986, there were no more than 15 in 1994 (EIU,
1996). Virtually nothing is known about the outcomes o f the privatisation programme in the 
other two early privatisers, namely Benin and Guinea. In the case o f Guinea, however, the 
privatisation programme was so poorly managed (in particular, with respect to the 
identification o f competent entrepreneurs who subsequently bought SOEs) that it seems 
unlikely that, in the context o f  the deepening economic crisis in that country, most 
privatisations have been successful.
As noted earlier, Mali embarked on a major privatisation programme in 1988. According to 
the W orld Bank, among the 14 SOEs that had been sold by 1993, results were "mixed". In 
particular, the programme was too hastily implemented and none o f the SOEs underwent 
internal restructuring before being privatised. They had therefore to contend with the "old 
problems o f weak management, obsolete technology, and inadequate working capital" but in 
a new, competitive economic environment (see World Bank, 1995:9 ).
Evidence on enterprise performance among the countries that embarked on privatisation from 
the late 1980s onwards is equally patchy and anecdotal. And, as discussed earlier, the large 
majority o f  SOEs among this group o f later privatisers were not sold until after 1993 so it is 
still too early to assess meaningfully their performance. Ghana was the other African country 
included in the Bank's 'Bureaucrats in Business' study. While there was a sizeable 
improvement in the financial performance o f  enterprises post-privatisation (due m ainly to 
"reduced overstaffing through layoffs" (World Bank, 1995:58)), real variable costs were still 
higher, and there was virtually no change in the size o f the savings-investment deficit.
With the slow pace o f sales divestitures (at least up until the early 1990s), it has been argued 
that there should be greater reliance on non-asset privatisations, most notably leases, and 
management and performance contracts where the state effectively relinquishes full control o f 
the enterprise to a private sector operator (see Berg, 1996). Up until recently, however, this 
type o f  full blown non-asset privatisation has been relatively rare in SSA.20 Instead, 
governments have typically attempted to reform SOEs by giving them greater managerial 
autonomy but have still maintained overall control. In general, these attempts to restructure 
SOEs as part o f public sector reform programmes have not been successful. The World Bank 
itself has concluded that:
"with a few notable exceptions, performance contracts and other attempts to boost the
efficiency o f  enterprises remaining under state control have failed....Making a performance
contract work may require conditions that seldom exist. Both parties must be committed.
Some recapitalization is usually part o f the restructuring programme, And there m ust be
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enforceable targets, incentives for success, and censure or financial punishment for failure. 
Lacking these essentials, governments and enterprises have often disregarded carefully 
negotiated contract provisions" (IBRD, 1994:108).
In Ghana, for example, "only four o f the eleven firms with performance contracts reached the 
negotiated targets, because o f lack o f financial discipline and performance accountability" 
(ibid: 108). In Cameroon, the performance o f nine out o f the 13 enterprises that had 
performance contracts signed between 1990 and 1995 remained the same or deteriorated with 
respect to all three (economic, financial and managerial) performance criteria. Given the 
inability o f the state to provide the very significant financial resources needed to restructure 
these enterprises, "it is no surprise that most o f the performance contracts could not be carried 
after they were signed" (Ejangue, 1996:5). In Nigeria, performance contracts were first 
signed only in 1992 but "anecdotal but broad evidence suggests that, in most cases, 
"commercialisation" is still an elusive goal" (IBRD, 1996:73). According to the Nigerian 
Government's own Technical Committee on Privatisation and Privatization, the main reason 
for this has been because "nothing has changed in the relationships between the Supervising 
M inistries and the commercialised enterprises under their charge" (TCPC, 1993).
7. FUTURE PROSPECTS
W hile privatisation in SSA will continue to be constrained by the same political and 
economic factors discussed above, for a number o f important reasons, the pace o f  the 
privatisation process is likely to continue to accelerate, possibly quite dramatically, over the 
next five years. Firstly, there are strong indications that the number and size o f  sales 
transactions in 1996 will be considerably larger than the record levels reached in 1995. For 
1996 and 1997, privatisation strategies have been or are currently being prepared for over 800 
enterprises in 17 countries for which information is available (see Table 10).
Secondly, major new privatisation programmes have been recently launched (or re-activated) 
or are currently in an advanced state o f preparation in over 15 countries in SSA. This 
includes countries where privatisation had stalled (Cameroon, Madagascar), countries such as 
Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, and Uganda that have made 
limited progress with privatisation during the last 10-15 years, and countries where 
privatisation is being embarked upon seriously for the first time (Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe). By the end o f  1997, there 
will only be a tiny minority o f  countries in SSA that will not have fully fledged privatisation
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programmes. Information on all on-going and scheduled programmes is incomplete, but a 
conservative estimate is that at least 1500 more SOEs will be privatised by the end o f 1999.
Thirdly, opportunities for greater participation by Africans could expand considerably. PTFs, 
investment funds and similar schemes are already being established in a number o f  countries, 
(including Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda) as are new stock exchanges (Malawi, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) or expansion o f  existing stock exchanges to cover wider 
geographical areas (most notably, the Abidjan stock exchange for francophone West Africa). 
Increased ownership involvement o f Africans in SOE divestitures will significantly reduce 
political opposition to privatisation, reduce dependence on foreign investors, and generally 
improve the saleability o f  SOEs, in particular the largest ones in the utilities and transport 
sectors. M anagement and employee buy-outs could also increase appreciably.
Fourthly, more governments are beginning to take concrete steps to privatise the largest SOEs 
that account for the bulk o f  public assets in m ost SSA countries. Rapid progress is already 
being made in the utilities sector in francophone West Africa. Similarly, the new Accelerated 
Divestiture Programme in Ghana includes the State Insurance Corporation, Sate Housing 
Corporation, Ghana Telecommunications Company and a major timber company. W here 
governments are still reluctant to sell 'strategic' SOEs (as in Kenya for example), it is still 
intended that the management o f  most o f  these enterprises will be effectively privatised 
through the use o f performance contracts and leases.
Fifthly, the World Bank, IMF, and most o f  the major aid agencies are significantly increasing 
the pressure on governments to privatise, and wherever possible sell, most SOEs within the 
next five years. Consequently, meeting privatisation targets is becoming an increasingly 
central feature o f the performance requirements specified in World Bank and other donor- 
supported economic reform programmes. At the same time, the level o f donor support for 
private sector or enterprise development programmes has increased considerably. Technical 
assistance for privatisation units is a major priority, and resources are also being made to 
pump prime PTFs and other types o f investment funds. Increasingly, the management o f  the 
privatisation programmes is itself being privatised as local and international consultants are 
contracted to prepare SOEs for sale. This will considerably reduce the bureaucratic delays 
that have been such a common feature o f privatisation programmes in the past in SSA.
And finally, with increased political commitment coupled with greater donor pressure, the 
privatisation process in SSA is likely to become increasingly bidder-driven. Asking/ 
references prices set by government for SOE divestitures will therefore, fall quite appreciably
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and may become increasingly irrelevant as governments seek to attain privatisation targets. 
Clearly, if  this happens, SOEs will become increasingly more saleable.
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1. Another 217 transactions were reported by Candoy-Sekse as being "planned". It is clear 
however that in some countries, many o f  these were never undertaken. The survey recorded 
that only 71 (32.7 percent) of these enterprises were subsequently privatised (57 sales, 8 
liquidations, and 6 non-asset divestitures).
2. Sales transactions of less than US$50,000 were excluded by Sader from his privatisation 
data base (which does not include liquidations and non-asset transactions).
3. Sales of assets (often by auction) also occur when SOEs are liquidated. Distinguishing 
therefore, between liquidations and this type o f  sale is often difficult.
4. Despite strenuous efforts, it was not possible to obtain detailed primary data on sales 
transactions from four francophone countries- Benin, Guinea, Mali, and Togo- that have had 
active privatisation programmes. There was no alternative, therefore, but to rely on the two 
World Bank data sets and the 1993-1995 update for these countries.
5. The Privatization International Yearbook and monthly magazine are useful sources of 
background information for a limited number o f  countries in SSA. The African Research 
Bulletin also gives information on privatisation programmes as a whole as well as progress 
made in privatising mainly larger enterprises.
6. A particular problem is ascertaining precisely the nature o f management and performance 
contracts established between governments and individual SOEs. In some countries (eg. 
Cameroon, Nigeria), most performance contracts have been with existing managements of 
SOEs whereas in other countries (eg Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal), private sector 
contractors have been brought in.
7. This is also the case in Tanzania.
8. In particular, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and Cargills.
9. The World Bank has reported that the total value o f SOE transactions was US$3.2 billion 
between 1988 and 1992 (See World Bank, 1995). An important reason why this figure is 
higher is that some enterprises have been included in the Sader data base and the subsequent 
World Bank up-date that are not privatisations in the true sense o f  the term. A notable 
example is the Hartley Platinum Mine in Zimbabwe valued at US$250 million.
10. In some countries, long delays in selling SOEs has seriously depressed the overall value 
of privatisation proceeds, especially when measured in foreign currency. In Ghana, for 
example, the GIHOC Paper Conversion Company was originally sold for C l250 million in 
1990 (US$3.83 million at prevailing exchange rates). However, this sale fell through and the 
company was re-advertised. A buyer was eventually found in 1994. The cedi sale price was 
unchanged but by then the US dollar equivalent value was only U S$1.3 million and only 10 
percent was paid up front. In the context o f rapidly depreciating currencies, foreign buyers 
clearly have a definite incentive to delay final payment for privatised SOEs. With high
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inflation, the same is also true for domestic debtors. In Nigeria,for example, just in the 12- 
month period to June 1994, the government lost 32 percent o f its expected receipts in 
purchasing power.
11. Five sectors accounted for 154 (85.1 percent) o f these US$1.0 + million transactions, 
namely agriculture (14 transactions), mining (4), manufacturing (103), hotels and tourism 
(20), and financial services (17). Within the manufacturing sector, four industries dominated 
namely, food processing (23), alcoholic beverages (11), textiles (8), and cement and non- 
metallic products (20).
12. Out o f  these, there was a total o f 35 (9.3 percent) management and/or worker buy-outs.
13. Information on the foreign exchange component was not available for approximately 10 
percent o f  all transactions.
14. Among the 178 largest sales transactions (ie. o f US$ 1.0+ million), the state maintained 
m inority shareholdings in 39 enterprises, and majority shareholdings in another 4. In some 
countries (eg Cote d'Ivoire), this is seen as a temporary measure until such a time that the 
remaining publically owned shares can be sold to private individuals and organisations
15. The principal stallers have been the military regimes in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
where privatisation programmes have been effectively suspended, and in Madagascar, 
Cameroon, and Zaire.
16. While almost all donors are strongly in favour o f privatisation as a general objective, they 
do not always support specific privatisations. For example, in 1996, Norwegian and Japanese 
donor agencies opposed the sale o f two SOEs in Tanzania because they had spent significant 
resources in modernising these enterprises and objected to them to be sold 'on the cheap' to 
companies from other countries.
17. Nonetheless, concerns about the transparency o f some SOE divestitures still arose in 
Nigeria.
18. In particular, one would have thought that the World Bank would be eager to support the 
case for comprehensive privatisation with case studies and other research that focuses on 
'success stories'.
19. These include breweries in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania, insurance and petroleum 
distribution companies in Nigeria, a large textile mill in Niger (at least up until the late 
1980s), and a agricultural machinery company in Mozambique.
20. The most well known and successful examples o f non-asset privatisations are the 
electricity and water companies operated by mainly French contractors under affermage 
arrangements in francophone West Africa.
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Other Total known 
Privatizations
E A S T  &  C E N T R A L  A F R IC A
Burundi 51 8 8 2 10
Comoros 10 - 0 0 0 0 0
Djibouti 9 -
Eritrea 40 - 0 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 180 1994 16 16 0 16
Kenya 240 1988 69 12 81 1 82
Madagascar 276 1988 41 39 80 0 80
Rwanda 38 - 1 0 1 0 1
Seychelles na c
Somalia 44 - 2 2 0 2
Sudan 138 - 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania 379 1993 55 26 81 18 99
Uganda 130 1987 58 9 67 67
Zaire 138 - 2 5 7 8 15
Sub-Total 1673 252 91 343 29 372
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Angola _
Botswana 9 - 0 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 50+ 1995 1 0 1 0 1
Malawi 44 1987 48 48 1 49
Mozambique 1989 612d 612 64 647
Namibia 50e - 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa - 3 3 0 3
Swaziland 10 - 1 0 1 0 1
Zambia 170 1991 91 13 104 7 111
Zimbabwe 60 - 1 0 1 0 1
S u b -T o ta l 757 13 770 71 841
G ra n d  T o ta l 1372 231 1865 225 2060
Notes:
Not available.
a. According to the World Bank's Adjustment in Africa Study, between 1-12 ents had been sold in Chad.
b. Includes both Federal and State SOEs.
c. Estimates
d. Includes the sale o f  400 small retail outlets.
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T able 2 : N um ber of sales transac tions over tim e
Country 80-87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 88-95
W EST A FR IC A
Benin 3 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 8
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 5 13a
Cote d'Ivoire 35 0 0 2 3 2 3 5 7 22
Ghana 7 0 5 10 13 12 6 36 25 107
Guinea 48 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Nigeria 0 0 16 5 10 12 5 5 1 54
Senegal 6 0 4 1 8 0 0 0 0 13
Togo 21 0 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 7
EAST, C EN TR A L AND 
SO U TH ERN  A FR IC A
Kenya 2 1 0 1 2 5 17 23 19 68
Malawi 1 0 45 0 0 0 1 0 0 47
Mozambique b 0 0 2 14 19 31 21 26 15 128
South Africa 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 4 21 5 19 49
Uganda 24 . . 0 0 0 3 3 9 20 59
Zambia 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 12 72 91
All countries 227 4 77 39 57 84 93 142 161 657
Notes:
a 1980-1994 only
b Includes only larger-scale privatisation undertaken by TRE.
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Table 3: Value at sales transactions 1988 - 1995 (US$ million)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total sales 726.9 82.1 136.5 205.0 651.4 653.6 175.2
Excluding South Africa 94.9 82.1 136.5 205.0 651.4 653.6 175.2
Excluding NPCC and 
Ashanti Goldmines
94.9 82.1 136.5 205.0 151.4 199.6 175.2
Mean 1.5 2.65 2.27 2.53 1.72 1.71 1.65
Median 0.31 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.36 0.26
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Table 4 : SOEs privatised by econom ic sector, 1980-1995
Sales Liquidations Other Total
Sector No. % No. % No % No, %
Agriculture 96 10.7 19 11.8 12 12.8 127 11.0
Forestry 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 1.1 2 0.2
Fishing 15 1.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 1.3
Mining 13 1.5 3 1.9 3 3.2 19 1.6
Manufacturing 466 52.1 42 26.1 30 31.9 538 46.5
Utilities 7 0.8 1 0.6 6 6.3 14 1.2
Construction 16 1.8 3 1.9 1 1.1 20 1.7
Trade 47 5.3 17 10.6 2 2.1 66 5.7
Hotels & Tourism 57 6.4 3 1.9 17 18.0 77 6.7
Transport & Storage 35 3.9 17 10.6 13 13.8 65 5.6
Real Estate 6 0.7 3 1.9 1 1.1 10 0.9
Other Services 17 1.9 3 1.9 0 0.0 20 1.7
Financial 47 5.3 7 4.3 0 0.0 54 4.7
Not specified 72 8.0 43 26.7 8 8.5 121 10.7
Totals: 895 100.2 161 100.2 94 99.9 1150 99.5
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Table 5: Value of SOE sales transactions in largest national
privatisation program m es in SSA, 1988-1995
Value o f  transaction % % receipts in
Country Mean Median Total Total foreign exchange
WEST AFRICA
Benin 6.61 3.10 52.9 1.9 100.0
Burkina Faso 2.84 0.39 31.2 1.1
Cameroon 1.48 1.48 3.0 0.1
Cote d'Ivoire 5.85 2.34 76.1 2.8 67.1
Ghana3 6.51 0.36 566.7 20.8 81.8
Guinea 0.69 0.55 7.6 0.3 . .
Nigeria 12.79 1.49 767.1 28.1 65.7
Senegal 3.23 0.62 48.4 1.8 24.8
Togo 5.57 2.30 39.0 1.4 84.3
EAST, CENTRAL AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Burundi 0.63 0.40 4.4 0.2
Kenya 1.63 0.45 117.6 4.3 12.2
Malawi 0.83 0.19 28.1 1.0
Mozambique b 0.69 0.20 92.2 3.4 79.4
South Africa 212.4 100.00 637.2 23.3
Tanzania 2.76 0.74 121.5 4.4 86.2
Uganda 3.97 0.60 55.6 2.0 81.8
Zambia 1.34 0.25 79.2 2.9 84.2
Zimbabwe 6.50 6.50 6.5 0.2 100.0
Total all countries: 4.69 0.37 2728.4 100.0 51.6
Notes: Only countries w ith more than US$4million recorded sales included.
.. Not available, 
a Up to end o f  1994 only.
b Larger companies only under jurisdiction of UTRE.
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Table 6: Value of transactions by m ain econom ic sector, 1988-1995
Value o f transaction % % receipts in
Country Mean Median Total Total foreign exchange
Agriculture 1.66 0.18 107.7 3.9 69.2
Forestry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fishing 2.58 0.93 23.2 0.9 24.6
Mining 106.67 1.2 960.0 35.2 94.1
Manufacturing 3.84 0.49 1225.9 44.9 29.3
Utilities 3.66 3.66 7.3 0.3 100.0
Construction 2.28 0.20 29.7 1.1 1.2
Trade 1.32 0.14 33.1 1.2 36.6
Hotels & Tourism 3.46 0.60 163.4 6.0 67.5
Transport & Storage 1.67 0.30 38.5 1.4 10.4
Real Estate 0.36 0.36 0.4 0.01 0.0
Other Services 0.62 0.33 7.5 0.3 16.0
Financial 4.25 1.81 127.4 4.7 9.4
Not specified 0.22 0.11 3.6 0.1 3.9




Table 9: Impact o f privatization on em ploym ent in SOEs in Zambia
Employees
Enterprise At privatiz­ Reported % change
1992 ation a redundancies from 1992
ASE 185 145 0 -21.6
Autocare 145 130 0 - 10.3
Chilanga Cement 883 822 0 -6.9
Coolwell Systems 29 25 0 - 13.8
Crushed Store Sales 136 125 0 - 6.6
Eagle Travel 129 119 0 -7.8
General Pharmaceuticals 97 82 0 - 15.5
Indeco Milling 569 51 3 -91.0
Monarch 282 185 0 -34.4
Mpongwa Development 1245 692 0 -44.4
National Breweries 847 585 0 -30.9
National Home Stores 930 na 406
Nkwazi Manufacturing 65 40 89 -38.5
Poultry processing 65 65 0 0
Prima Marble (L) 9 0 0 -100.0
Zambia Breweries 1654 753 0 -54.5
Zambia Consumer Buying 1670 na 720
Zambia Engin & Const 532 60 27 -88.7
Zambia Makings 80 8 34 -88.8
Zambia National Wholesale 1037 na 134 na
Zambia Sugar 5736 '4000+' 0 -30.3
Zura Zambia 23 19 0 - 17.4
Notes:
a 1993 or 1994
Source: World Bank, Zambia: Second Privatization and Industrial Reform Credit. 1993. and 
unpublished data from the Zambian Privatizaton Agency.
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Burkina Faso 5 16 21
Cote d'Ivoire 11 18 29









Sierra Leone 10 10
Sub-total 5 21 74 159




Mozambique 12 5 17
Swaziland




Zambia 48 5 45 98
Zimbabwe .. 16
Sub-total 68 225 294 674
Grand Total 73 246 368 830
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